NTSB Identification: MIA94LA200. The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.

Accident occurred AUG-23-94 at OSTEEN, FL
Aircraft: CESSNA 152, registration: N6088H
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

THE PILOTS STATED THAT THEY PERFORMED A SIMULATED FORCED LANDING AND INITIATED A G0-AROUND AT 600 FT. NORMAL ENGINE POWER WAS OBTAINED. WHILE CLIMBING THROUGH 800 FT POWER SUDDENLY WENT TO IDLE, AND ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE POWER WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. DURING A FORCED LANDING IN A FIELD THE AIRCRAFT NOSED OVER. AFTER THE
ACCIDENT THE CARBURETOR WAS CHANGED, AND THE ENGINE OPERATED TO FULL POWER. A 3/32 INCH DIAMETER PORTION OF AN INSECT WAS FOUND IN THE CARBURETOR MIXTURE METERING SLEEVE WHICH BLOCKED THE PICKUP TO THE FUEL DISCHARGE NOZZLE. THE INSECT PORTION WAS TOO LARGE TO HAVE ENTERED THE CARBURETOR THROUGH THE FUEL INLET
SCREEN. THE CARBURETOR WAS OVERHAULED IN 10/93, AND WAS INSTALLED ON THE ACCIDENT AIRCRAFT ON 8/5/94, 50 FLIGHT HOURS BEFORE THE ACCIDENT.
Probable Cause
ENGINE POWER LOSS DUE TO BLOCKAGE OF THE CARBURETOR FUEL DISCHARGE NOZZLE PICKUP BY AN INSECT THAT INADVERTENTLY ENTERED THE CARBURETOR DURING OVERHAUL RESULTING IN FUEL STARVATION.
 

NTSB Identification: DEN89LA134 For details, refer to NTSB microfiche number 39381A

Accident occurred JUN-06-89 at LA SALLE, CO
Aircraft: RYAN ST-3KR, registration: N48749
Injuries: 1 Serious.

THE PRIVATE PLT WAS FLYING HIS ANTIQUE AIRPLANE ON A LOCAL FLIGHT TO CHECK THE COMPASS. THIS PLANE HAD BEEN UNDER RESTORATION FOR AN EXTENDED TIME PRIOR TO THIS FLIGHT.DURING FLIGHT, THE ENGINE LOST POWER AND THE PLT MADE A FORCED LANDING IN AN ALFALFA FIELD. AFTER ROLLING 200 FT IN 18 INCH HIGH ALFALFA, THE PLANE NOSED OVER. A POST ACCIDENT INSPECTION REVEALED EVIDENCE THAT THE FUEL TANK VENT WAS CLOGGED BY AN INSECT NEST (DIRT), WHICH RESTRICTED THE FLOW OF FUEL. AFTER THE VENT WAS CLEANED, THE ENGINE RAN NORMALLY.
Probable Cause
FOREIGN MATERIAL (INSECT NEST) BLOCKING THE FUEL SYSTEM VENT, WHICH RESULTED IN A RESTRICTION OF FUEL FLOW AND FUEL STARVATION. A RELATED FACTOR WAS THE ALFALFA CROP IN THE EMERGENCY LANDING AREA.

NTSB Identification: ATL96LA076. The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.

Accident occurred APR-03-96 at HUGER, SC
Aircraft: Hiller UH12-E, registration: N14MQ
Injuries: 1 Serious, 1 Minor.

During helicopter operations using a long line to spray jellied fuel to conduct a controlled burn of trees, the engine quit. At the time, the helicopter was just above the tree tops about 75 feet above the ground. An autorotation was established toward the nearest clearing. The helicopter struck trees before reaching the clearing, resulting in a hard landing on the clearing's edge. The pilot said that the engine's quitting was consistent with fuel exhaustion, however, he had been flying 40 minutes with the 1.5 hour supply that was in the helicopter at the initial departure. Subsequently, the fuel tank vent was found to be clogged by dirt from an insect nest and insect parts.
Probable Cause
The blocked fuel vent line that resulted in engine stoppage. A factor was tall trees that intervened the helicopter's flight path.
 
 

NTSB Identification: NYC94LA121. The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.

Accident occurred JUL-12-94 at WHITE PLAINS, NY
Aircraft: PIPER PA-60-700P, registration: N323CB
Injuries: 1 Minor, 4 Uninjured.

DURING AN ABORTED TAKEOFF, THE AIRPLANE OVERRAN THE 4451 FOOT LONG RUNWAY, WENT DOWN A HILL, AND STRUCK A FENCE. ACCORDING TO THE PILOT, "DURING THE TAKEOFF ROLL, THE INDICATED AIRSPEED NEEDLE CLIMBED TO APPROXIMATELY 60 KNOTS, BUT THEN WOULD GO NO FURTHER...MY ATTEMPTS TO DISLODGE IT BY TAPPING ON THE FACE OF
THE GAUGE WERE FUTILE...I PULLED BACK THE THROTTLES AND APPLIED FULL BRAKES..." THE PILOT REPORTED THAT BASED ON THE EXISTING CONDITIONS "THE AIRPLANE CAN ACCELERATE FROM REST TO ROTATION SPEED AND BACK TO REST IN LESS THAN 3500 FEET." THE EXAMINATION OF THE AIRPLANE REVEALED THE PITOT TUBE WAS INTERNALLY OBSTRUCTED WITH AN INSECT AND MUD.
Probable Cause
The pilot's delay in aborting the takeoff. A factor was internal obstruction of the pitot tube.
 

NTSB Identification: MKC88LA165 For details, refer to NTSB microfiche number 37125A

Accident occurred AUG-28-88 at ST. LOUIS, MO
Aircraft: CESSNA 182Q, registration: N97076
Injuries: 3 Uninjured.

THE PLT SAID THAT DURING A NIGHT TAKEOFF ROLL, HE NOTICED AN INOPERATIVE AIRSPEED INDICATOR, AND ELECTED TO ABORT THE TAKEOFF. UNABLE TO STOP IN THE REMAINING DISTANCE, THE ACFT RAN OFF THE END OF THE RUNWAY ONTO THE GRASS OVERRUN COLLAPSING THE NOSE WHEEL. POST ACCIDENT INSPECTION REVEALED AN INSECT IN THE PITOT SYSTEM CAUSING THE AIRSPEED INDICATOR TO BE INOPERATIVE.
 

NTSB Identification: MIA91LA156 For details, refer to NTSB microfiche number 44028A

Accident occurred MAY-31-91 at QUINCY, FL
Aircraft: CHAMPION 7ECA, registration: N9646S
Injuries: 2 Serious.

THE ENGINE LOST POWER SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF AND THE AIRPLANE CRASHED WHILE ATTEMPTING TO RETURN TO THE AIRPORT. POST CRASH EXAMINATION OF THE AIRCRAFT REVEALED THE FUEL TANK VENT LINE WAS CLOGGED WITH AN INSECT NEST. NO MECHANICAL FAILURES OF THE ENGINE OR AIRFRAME WERE FOUND. CHECKING THE FUEL VENT LINE FOR
OBSTRUCTION IS AN ITEM ON THE PREFLIGHT CHECKLIST WHICH IS CONTAINED IN SECTION III, NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES, IN THE AIRCRAFT'S OPERATING MANUAL.
Probable Cause
THE PILOT'S INADEQUATE PREFLIGHT INSPECTION AND THE BLOCKED VENT LINE.
 

MIA94LA200

On August 23, 1994, about 0945 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 152, N6088H, registered to Comair Aviation Academy, nosed over in a field near Osteen, Florida, while making a forced landing following loss of engine power, while on a 14 CFR Part 91 instructional flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed. The aircraft received substantial damage and the commercial-rated flight instructor and private-rated dual student were not injured. The flight originated at Sanford, Florida, on August 23, 1994, about 0845.

The pilots stated that they had performed a simulated engine out with a descent to about 600 feet. At 600 feet a "go-around" was initiated and full engine power was obtained. When climbing through 800 feet the engine retarded to idle without warning. Attempts to regain engine power were unsuccessful and a forced landing was made in a field. During landing rollout the aircraft nosed over on the soft ground.

Postcrash examination of the aircraft was performed by a FAA inspector. The engine was started and operated only to about 1,000 rpm. The carburetor was replaced and the engine operated to full power. Examination of the carburetor indicated that a foreign object about 3/32 of an inch in diameter was located in the mixture metering sleeve and blocking the pickup for the fuel discharge nozzle. The foreign object was identified by magnification to be part of an insect. It was determined the foreign object was too large to have passed into the carburetor through the fuel inlet screen. The carburetor had been overhauled in October 1993, and installed on N6088H on August 5, 1994, 50 flight hours before the accident. See Component Inspection Report.

(The location is different from what was reported on the Preliminary Report, Aviation.)
 

NTSB Identification: IAD96LA088. The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.

Accident occurred JUN-01-96 at OAKWOOD, OH
Aircraft: Brantly B2B, registration: N2261U
Injuries: 1 Serious, 1 Minor.

The pilot reported that while he maneuvered during the approach to land, the helicopter experienced a total loss of engine power. When the power loss occurred, he "...nosed down and put the collective down..." to enter autorotation. He "...picked a spot [for landing] ... looked at the rotor RPM (RRPM), it was 320... [and] at 60 to 80 feet I pulled collective..." to begin deceleration. The helicopter struck the ground with a forward speed of 30 MPH with the tail skid striking the ground prior to the main gear. According to the pilot, the normal operating range for RRPM is 400-472 and that 400 RRPM was minimum for autorotation. The pilot did not possess a helicopter rating, but had received 5 to 6 hours of instruction in helicopters. He reported that he had flown 28 hours within the preceding six months, including 3 hours in the accident aircraft. Postaccident examination revealed that the fuel tank vent tube assembly was clogged with "...insect and nest remains... ." The most recent documented 100-hour maintenance inspection of the helicopter occurred on 5/18/70.
Probable Cause
a loss of engine power due to inadequate maintenance and inspection by the owner/operator which failed to detect the clogged fuel vent line, and the pilot's improper autorotation. A related factor was the pilot's inadequate training/familiarization with helicopter emergency procedures.

IAD96LA088

On June 1, 1996, at 2100 eastern daylight time, a Brantly B2B helicopter, N2261U, sustained substantial damage when it collided with terrain during a forced landing near Oakwood, Ohio. The certificated private pilot/helicopter owner received minor injuries and the one passenger sustained serious injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident, no flight plan was filed. The flight operated under 14 CFR Part 91. The helicopter departed private property adjacent to the accident site for a local orientation flight, exact time unknown.

The pilot reported that while he maneuvered during the approach to land, the helicopter experienced a total loss of engine power. The pilot said that when the power loss occurred, he "...nosed down and put the collective down..." to enter autorotation. He stated that when he attempted to enter autorotation the helicopter was at "...200-300 feet at around 40 MPH." He reported that he "...picked a spot [for landing]... looked at the rotor RPM (RRPM), it was 320...[and] at 60 to 80 feet I pulled collective..." to begin deceleration. The pilot said that the helicopter struck the ground with a forward speed of 30 MPH with the tail skid striking the ground prior to the main gear. According to the pilot, the normal operating range for RRPM is 400-472 and that 400 RRPM was minimum for autorotation. While discussing the attempted autorotation, the pilot said: "Normally, the rotor will speed up when you bring collective in."

The response to an engine power loss at altitude is described in a United States Army Training Circular as follows: "Upon detecting engine failure, the [pilot] will lower the collective to maintain rotor RPM within limits while adjusting the pedals to trim the aircraft. He will select a suitable landing area and, using turns and adjusting airspeed as necessary, maneuver the aircraft for a safe landing to the intended landing area. At approximately 100 feet AGL, apply aft cyclic to initiate a smooth, progressive deceleration. Maintain aircraft alignment with the touchdown area by properly adjusting the pedals and cyclic. Adjust the collective as necessary to prevent excessive rotor RPM. At approximately 15 feet AGL, apply sufficient collective to control the rate of descent and ground speed. Adjust the cyclic to attain a landing attitude, and apply collective as necessary just prior to touchdown to cushion the landing." Excerpts from the referenced publication (United States Army Training Circular No. 1-211: Aircrew Training Manual Utility Helicopter p. 6-76, 9 December 1992) are appended.

The pilot reported that he "...lost fuel pressure which resulted in engine failure." A postaccident inspection of the aircraft and its records by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aviation Safety Inspector revealed that the fuel overboard vent tube assembly was clogged. The FAA Inspector stated: "Cutting open the tube near the open overboard vent end...resulted in finding insect and nest remains that filled the tube. The vent tube was plugged in at least two places and a third plugged location was not opened up for examination." The examination of the aircraft records revealed that the most recent documented 100 hour inspection was accomplished on May 18, 1970.

The pilot reported that he did not possess a helicopter rating, and that he had received "...5 to 6 hours..." of instruction in helicopters. According to the Ohio State Highway Patrol Aircraft Crash Record, the pilot reported that he had flown 28 hours within the preceding six months, including about 3 hours in the accident aircraft.

NTSB Identification: FTW83LA269 For details, refer to NTSB microfiche number 23066A

Accident occurred JUN-07-83 at SAN ANTONIO, TX
Aircraft: BEECH 95-B55, registration: N1757W
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

WHILE ON THE TAKEOFF ROLL, WITH APRX 1400 FT OF RWY REMAINING, THE PLT NOTICED THAT THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF AIRSPEED. HE THEREFORE ELECTED TO ABORT THE TAKEOFF, THE RWY WAS A COMBINATION OF ASPHALT & TURF. FOLLOWING HIS DECISION TO ABORT, THE REMAINING PORTION OF THE RWY WAS TURF, STILL DAMP FROM THE MORNING DEW. HE WAS UNABLE TO STOP ON THE REMAINING RWY. AFTER OVERRUNNING THE RWY, THE ACFT HIT AN IRRIGATION DITCH & NOSED
OVER. A POST-ACCIDENT EXAM REVEALED INSECT LARVAE IMBEDDED IN THE PITOT TUBE, ABOUT 1/8 INCH FROM THE TUBE'S END. ACCORDING TO THE PLT, THE ACFT HAD BEEN PARKED OUTSIDE & HAD NOT BEEN FLOWN FOR APRX 70 DAYS PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT FLT. HE FURTHER RELATED THAT HE NOTICED NOTHING ABNORMAL ABOUT THE PITOT SYS DURING HIS PREFLT INSPECTION.

Probable Cause

Pitot/static system..Foreign object
Aircraft preflight..Inadequate..Pilot in command
Flight/nav instruments,airspeed indicator..Inoperative
Aborted takeoff..Delayed..Pilot in command

Contributing Factors

Airport facilities,runway/landing area condition..Wet
Terrain condition..Ditch
 

NTSB Identification: FTW86LA013 For details, refer to NTSB microfiche number 30527A

Accident occurred OCT-11-85 at HOUSTON, TX
Aircraft: PIPER PA-28, registration: N5341W
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

THE PASSENGERS STATED THAT THE PILOT WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN HIGHER POWER SETTINGS ON A GO-AROUND FROM A LOW APPROACH TO AN AIRPORT, AND ELECTED TO LAND ON A RURAL STREET. AN EXAMINATION OF THE ENGINE REVEALED INSECT NESTS IN THE INTAKE MANIFOLD AND WATER IN THE GASOLINE.

Probable Cause

Fuel system,carburetor..Blocked(partial)
Aircraft preflight..Inadequate..Pilot in command
Fluid,fuel..Contamination

NTSB Identification: FTW90LA162 For details, refer to NTSB microfiche number 41921A

Accident occurred SEP-02-90 at HEBER SPRINGS, AR
Aircraft: PIPER PA28-201T, registration: N2082Y
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

DURING A TAKEOFF THE OBSERVED AN ERRATIC AIRSPEED INDICATION, FOLLOWED BY ZERO INDICATION, SO HE ELECTED TO ABORT THE TAKEOFF. DURING THE ABORTED TAKEOFF HE ATTEMPTED A HIGH SPEED TURN TO THE LEFT OFF THE RUNWAY, COLLAPSING THE NOSE GEAR AND CAUSING SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE TO AIRPLANE. THE ERRATIC AIRSPEED WAS THE DIRECT
RESULT OF A BLOCKAGE OF THE PITOT STATIC SYSTEM BY AN INSECT NEST.
Probable Cause
THE PILOT'S FAILURE TO CONDUCT A THOROUGH PREFLIGHT AND HIS ATTEMPT TO EXECUTE A TURN AT HIGH SPEED.

NTSB Identification: FTW91LA006 For details, refer to NTSB microfiche number 43817A

Accident occurred OCT-14-90 at ARKADELPHIA, AR
Aircraft: BEECH 77, registration: N38021
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.

THE AIRPLANE WAS BEING FLOWN TO AN AIRPORT WITH AVAILABLE FUEL WHEN ON FINAL APPROACH, A TOTAL LOSS OF POWER OCCURRED. THE PILOT LANDED THE AIRPLANE IN A FIELD WITH HIGH VEGETATION AND LOW TREES. DURING THE LANDING ROLL, THE AIRPLANE WAS DAMAGED. POST-ACCIDENT EXAMINATION OF THE AIRPLANE REVEALED THAT AN INSECT'S MUD NEST WAS OBSTRUCTING THE LEFT FUEL TANK VENT.
Probable Cause
FUEL STARVATION TO THE ENGINE DUE TO A BLOCKED FUEL SYSTEM VENT. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WERE THE PILOT'S INADEQUATE PREFLIGHT, AND CONTACTING HIGH VEGETATION AND LOW TREES DURING THE LANDING ROLL.

NTSB Identification: FTW96LA392. The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.

Accident occurred SEP-19-96 at BOULDER, CO
Aircraft: Beech H35, registration: N5428D
Injuries: 2 Minor.

At an altitude of 200 feet above ground level, following a touch and go landing, a total loss of power occurred and a forced landing was conducted on rough and uneven terrain. Examination of the aircraft provided evidence that the left fuel tank, which had been selected, had a totally blocked fuel vent due to a mud based insect nest. The nest was internal in the vent and could not be seen during normal inspection. The aircraft had not been flown in 20 days prior to the accident flight.
Probable Cause
a loss of engine power due to a plugged fuel tank vent which resulted in fuel starvation. A factor was the lack of suitable terrain for the forced landing.
FTW96LA392

On September 19, 1996, at 1715 mountain daylight time, a Beech H35, N5428D, made a forced landing due to a loss of power 1 mile north of Boulder Municipal Airport (1V5), Boulder, Colorado. The private pilot and his passenger received minor injuries and the aircraft sustained substantial damage. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for this local area personal flight conducted under Title 14 CFR Part 91 and no flight plan was filed. The flight departed 1V5 earlier in the afternoon.

According to the pilot, he was at 200 feet above ground level (agl) off the departure end of runway 8, following a touch-and-go landing, when the engine lost power. He said he turned left toward an open field and conducted a forced landing with the landing gear down and 10 degrees of flaps selected. His statement said he struck a small ditch during landing roll and the nose landing gear collapsed. The aircraft slid on its nose across rocky/rough terrain and the engine separated before the aircraft came to a stop.

The pilot and his passenger exited through the right rear window because the cabin door was jammed. They incurred minor injuries during impact and egress.

In a telephone interview, the pilot said he had approximately 10 gallons of fuel in the left tank and had selected that tank to feed the engine a short time before power was lost. Examination of the aircraft by an FAA inspector provided verification that the left tank was selected. Due to wing damage, fuel quantity could not be verified.

The FAA inspector said both propeller blades were bent rearward and bore both longitudinal and chordwise gouges and scratches. Both blades had leading edge damage and the ground contained propeller slash marks.

Examination of the engine provided no evidence of mechanical preimpact failure or malfunction and examination of the fuel system provided evidence that the left tank vent was plugged with a material that had the appearance and consistency of a mud constructed insect nest. The vent tube was totally plugged and the material was not visible while conducting a normal inspection of the tube.

According to available information, the aircraft had been flown 17 hours in the last 90 days, 1.7 hours in the last 30 days, and the accident flight was the first flight in the last 20 days, with takeoff and flight, until shortly before the accident, conducted with the right fuel tank selected.

NTSB Identification: CHI89DEM06 For details, refer to NTSB microfiche number 41854A

Accident occurred AUG-08-89 at MANISTEE, MI
Aircraft: CESSNA 152, registration: N96863
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.

THE STUDENT PILOT STATED THAT DURING INITIAL CLIMBOUT, HE HEARD A CHANGE IN THE ENGINE NOISE. THE "AIRSPEED DECREASED AND THE AIRCRAFT BEGAN TO LOSE ALTITUDE." THE STUDENT PILOT MADE A FORCED LANDING IN AN OPEN FIELD.  THE AIRCRAFT NOSED OVER DURING THE LANDING ROLL AND CAME TO REST INVERTED IN THE FIELD. POST-ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE FUEL METERING JET FROM THE FLOAT CHAMBER OF THE CARBURETOR WAS BLOCKED BY A LARGE INSECT, RESULTING IN PARTIAL FUEL STARVATION.
Probable Cause
THE PARTIAL LOSS OF POWER DURING INITIAL CLIMBOUT, AND THE AIRCRAFT'S SUBSEQUENT NOSE OVER DURING THE FORCED LANDING ROLL.
 
NTSB Identification: CHI92DTG02 For details, refer to NTSB microfiche number 47468A

Accident occurred JUN-13-92 at BISBEE, ND
Aircraft: CALLAIR A9B, registration: N7761V
Injuries: 1 Minor.

THE PILOT EXPERIENCED A LOSS OF ENGINE POWER DURING THE PULL-UP FOR A REVERSAL TURN IN AN AERIAL APPLICATION MANEUVER. PILOT MADE A FORCED LANDING IN A FIELD, AND THE AIRCRAFT NOSED OVER DURING LANDING ROLLOUT. THE FUEL SELECTOR WAS IN THE RIGHT TANK POSITION. THE INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE RIGHT FUEL TANK VENT WAS COMPLETELY BLOCKED BY AN INSECT'S NEST.
Probable Cause
THE LOSS OF ENGINE POWER DUE TO FUEL STARVATION RESULTING FROM THE PILOT'S INADEQUATE PREFLIGHT INSPECTION.

NTSB Identification: CHI97LA190. The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.

Accident occurred JUN-29-97 at BYRON, MI
Aircraft: DIETRICH NIEUPORT 12, registration: N169RD
Injuries: 1 Serious.

The pilot said that the accident flight was the first flight following repairs made to the engine. He indicated that while preparing the airplane for the flight, several "mud-wasp" nests were found and removed. He said that during the initial climb the engine began to lose power. The airplane was able to clear trees 300' beyond the end of the runway; however then encountered a stall/spin into trees and the terrain. Contamination was found in the left fuel filter which the pilot indicated in all
likelihood came from an insect nest which was not cleared from the fuel line after the repairs.
Probable Cause
The owner/pilot mechanic's inadequate inspection of the aircraft which led to contamination (other than water) of the fuel filter.

CHI97LA190

On June 29, 1997, at 1536 eastern daylight time, an amateur built, Nieuport 12, N169RD, was destroyed during impact with trees and the terrain after takeoff from a private sod strip near Byron, Michigan. The private pilot received serious injuries. Witnesses stated that the engine suffered a loss of power during climb and they observed the airplane turning as though to return to the airport. The personal 14 CFR Part 91 flight was operating in visual meteorological conditions. No flight plan was on file. The local flight was originating at the time of the accident.

The pilot stated that this was to be the first flight after a repair of the engine. He said that several "mud-wasp" nests were removed from various portions of the airplane which has accumulated while the airplane was inactive. He said that on initial climb the engine began to lose power. He said that there were a row of trees 300 feet from the departure end of the runway. The airplane initially cleared the trees, but in the pilots words "the plane stall-spun into a swamp."

Subsequent examination of the accident airplane revealed contamination in the filter for the left carburetor, which the pilot indicated in all likelihood came from an insect nest which was not cleared from the fuel line which was open to the elements while the airplane was inactive.

NTSB Identification: BFO93LA024 For details, refer to NTSB microfiche number 48211A

Accident occurred JAN-31-93 at LANHAM, MD
Aircraft: GRUMMAN AMERICAN AA-5, registration: N1383R
Injuries: 1 Serious.

ABOUT 10 MINUTES AFTER TAKEOFF, AT AN ALTITUDE OF 1,400 FEET MSL, THE AIRPLANE'S ENGINE LOST TOTAL POWER. THE PILOT COULD NOT RESTART THE ENGINE SO HE MADE A FORCED LANDING IN A RESIDENTIAL AREA. DUE TO THE CONGESTED AREA, THE PILOT COULD NOT MANEUVER THE AIRPLANE. TO AVOID HITTING A HOME OR POWERLINE, THE PILOT STALLED THE AIRPLANE AT ABOUT 200 FEET ABOVE THE GROUND. THE AIRPLANE FELL 200 FEET ONTO A ROAD. EXAMINATION OF THE
WRECKAGE DISCLOSED THAT THE LEFT AND RIGHT FUEL VENT LINES WERE TOTALLY BLOCKED BY INSECT NESTS, WHICH TERMINATED THE FLOW OF FUEL TO THE ENGINE. THE BLOCKAGES WERE FOUND IN THE FUEL VENT LINES AT THE WING ROOT.
Probable Cause
THE BLOCKAGE OF THE RIGHT AND LEFT FUEL VENT LINE WHICH PREVENTED THE FLOW OF FUEL TO THE ENGINE CAUSING TOTAL POWER LOSS.

NTSB Identification: ATL90DKJ05 For details, refer to NTSB microfiche number 40988A

Accident occurred APR-13-90 at ALTOONA, AL
Aircraft: HOOD QUICKIE, registration: N36RH
Injuries: 1 Minor.

DURING FLIGHT, THE ENGINE LOST POWER. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE AIRCRAFT COLLIDED WITH TREES WHEN THE PILOT WAS UNABLE TO STOP IN THE EMERGENCY LANDING AREA THAT WAS SELECTED. AN INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT FUEL WAS REMAINING, BUT THE VENT PORT WAS CLOGGED BY MUD FROM AN INSECT WEST.
Probable Cause
THE PILOT'S INADEQUATE PREFLIGHT AND A BLOCKED FUEL VENT, WHICH RESULTED IN FUEL STARVATION.
 
NTSB Identification: ATL94LA026

Accident occurred DEC-04-93 at GRIFFIN, GA
Aircraft: CESSNA 150, registration: N4092J
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

WHILE MANEUVERING THE AIRPLANE FOR A 45 DEGREE ENTRY INTO THE TRAFFIC PATTERN, THE ENGINE LOST POWER. AFTER AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO RESTART THE ENGINE, THE PILOT SELECTED AN OPEN FIELD FOR AN EMERGENCY LANDING. ON LANDING ROLL, THE PILOT INTENTIONALLY SWERVED AND HIT A TREE WITH THE LEFT WING TO AVOID COLLIDING WITH A HOUSE AT THE END OF THE FIELD. POST ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION OF THE AIRPLANE REVEALED THAT THE FUEL TANK VENT
SYSTEM WAS COMPLETELY BLOCKED BY AN INSECT NEST INSIDE THE VENT.
Probable Cause
FUEL STARVATION CAUSED BY FOREIGN MATTER BLOCKAGE OF THE FUEL TANK VENT SYSTEM.

ATL96LA076

On April 3, 1996, about 1225 eastern standard time, a Hiller UH12-E, N14MQ, landed hard during an emergency descent near Huger, South Carolina. The helicopter was operated under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 137, and visual flight rules. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. A flight plan was not filed for the local aerial application flight. The commercial pilot was seriously injured, his observer received minor injuries, and the helicopter was substantially damaged. The flight departed from a work site near Huger, about 1100.

The pilot was performing controlled burning, using a long line, in the Francis Marion Forest. He reported that the engine lost power and an autorotative landing was attempted to a clear area.

The pilot reported that the engine quit consistent with fuel exhaustion. He also reported that he had flown a total of about 40 minutes, and that the fuel tank contained 30 gallons of 100LL fuel prior to the initial departure. Additionally, he said the helicopter normally used 20 gallons per hour yielding about 1.5 hours of endurance. When the helicopter was moved from the accident site, it was noted that the fuel tank was ruptured, allowing fuel to leak from it. During further examination of the helicopter, the fuel tank vent was found clogged by fine, brownish dirt and insect parts.

LAX99LA164

On April 25, 1999, at 1007 hours Pacific daylight time, a Beech 36TC, N36MN, collided with a vehicle while attempting a forced landing on the shoulder of interstate highway 15 near Lake Elsinore, California. The forced landing was precipitated by a loss of engine power while in cruise. The aircraft was owned and
operated by the pilot under 14 CFR Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations. The aircraft incurred substantial damage and the vehicle minor damage. The private pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured. There were no injuries to persons on the ground. The personal flight originated at 0900 as a round robin
cross-country from Chino to Thermal, California, and was returning to Chino when the accident occurred.

In a telephone interview with the Safety Board on April 26, the pilot reported that he was returning to Chino from Thermal when the engine smoothly quit. He switched fuel tanks, turned on the electric boost pump and attempted to obtain a restart, without success. As the aircraft descended, he selected a clear area on
the shoulder of the interstate highway for a landing. Nearing touchdown, he had to maneuver to avoid a highway sign and the right wing contacted the back of a pickup truck. The pilot further reported that as the aircraft touched down, the engine restarted.

During the interview, the pilot stated that the aircraft had been in a local paint shop for the past 60 days for repainting. This was the first flight after the aircraft was picked up. When he departed from Chino on the outbound leg, the pilot used the right fuel tank because the fuel indicators showed it to be the fullest tank. The 20-minute flight to Thermal was uneventful and the pilot shut down the engine after landing. The pilot was on the ground 10 minutes, then restarted the aircraft for the return flight to Chino. The engine start and flight was accomplished on the left fuel tank because the fuel gage showed it to be 3/4 full while the right indicated 1/2 tank. The pilot stated that he performed a thorough engine run-up before takeoff from Thermal and that the flight to the point of power loss was uneventful.

The aircraft was recovered without the necessity of disassembly or disturbance to any aircraft system. A Federal Aviation Administration airworthiness inspector from the Riverside, California, Flight Standards District Office examined the aircraft at the recovery facility. The fuel tanks and lines were intact with no evidence of leakage. One pint of fuel was drained from the left tank while the right tank contained 15 gallons. The fuel vent lines for the left tank were clear. The rear vent lines for the right tank were also unobstructed. The forward vent line for the right tank was found plugged with insect debris and dirt. Further examination of the forward right tank line revealed that it was disconnected at the B-nut, which connects the line to a check valve and open to atmosphere inside the wing.

The fuel indicating system was examined by powering up the aircraft electrical system and manipulating the float sensors in the tanks. The right tank sending unit and cockpit gage was found to be accurate. The left tank sending unit and gage displayed erratic indications of quantity. On initial power up the left tank gage displayed 3/4 tank. Subsequent shutdowns and power ups of the system yielded tank quantity indications of 1/4, full, and 3/4 again.

No discrepancies were noted with the engine.

In his written statement, the pilot reported that prior to the accident he had not used a dipstick or other qualitative observational method the accurately determine the fuel load on the airplane, but rather used a method relying on the gages and consumption calculations.

MIA99FA140

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On April 23, 1999, about 1800 central daylight time, a Beech B95A, N6600, purchased on April 9, 1999, by U.S. Air Salvage, collided with trees during a forced landing near Fountain, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 ferry flight. The airplane was destroyed and the private-rated pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The flight originated at 1734, from the Panama City-Bay County International Airport, Panama City, Florida.

The landing gears were braced down and no radios were installed in the accident airplane when the flight departed. The accident airplane and another airplane (N5720K) planned to depart as a flight of two. The pilot of N5720K, who was the accident pilot's father, planned to communicate to air traffic control for both
flights.

According to a transcription of communications with the Panama City-Bay County International Airport Air Traffic Control (ATC) Tower, at 1729.55, the pilot of N5720K contacted the ground controller and reported "yes sir we're a bonanza on the north end of the field and we're operating with november six six zero zero he doesn't have radios." The pilot of N5720K also advised the ground controller that he would like to taxi out in front of the accident airplane, but it would be the first to depart. The controller questioned the pilot about the direction of flight after departure and after responding, the controller cleared the flight to taxi to runway 23. At 1731.46, the controller contacted the pilot of N5720K and asked "bonanza two zero kilo understand the ah travelair is going to be departing prior to you" to which the pilot responded "unable to decipher." Four seconds later the controller contacted the pilot and stated "roger you all got the ah signals worked up for him to depart" to which the pilot responded "yeah when i face him he's ready to go." The controller acknowledged that transmission and at 1733.56, the pilot of N5720K contacted the local controller and reported "tower two zero kilo and six six zero zero are ready to go." The controller cleared the flight to takeoff with a left turn to the north after departure. At 1734.15, the pilot of N5720K reported "two zero kilo ah left turn out." The local controller again cleared the flight to takeoff and at 1734.31, the pilot of N5720K responded "six six hundred is ready to go first." The local controller advised the pilot "roger he's cleared as well." At 1737.10, the controller advised the pilot that a frequency change was approved and suggested that he contact Tyndall tower and provided the appropriate frequency. The pilot acknowledged this and there were no further communications with the pilot of N5720K with the Panama City Air Traffic Control Tower.

According to the accident pilot's father, after departure, the accident pilot motioned to him by visual signals that he needed to land the airplane. He observed that the accident pilot had landed and flew over that area. He noted the crash site, landed in a nearby field, then proceeded to the accident site.

Another witness who was flying in N5720K reported that after takeoff, the accident airplane was flying behind and at a lower altitude than the altitude they were flying at (2,500 feet). He observed that they were flying above a 4-lane highway and about 10-15 minutes into the flight, the accident airplane climbed to the altitude they were flying at and was at their 9 o'clock position. At this time he observed the flashing of the gear lights and "...we knew he was having problems." He observed the accident pilot motioning with his hand that he needed to land the airplane and both occupants in N5720K responded by hand signals that they understood. The pilot of the airplane he was a passenger in began to turn to the right toward an airport that was located approximately 28 miles away but he noticed that the accident airplane was not following. He noticed that the accident pilot continued to flash the lights and use hand signals, which was acknowledged by dipping the wings. The accident airplane then flew under their airplane flying at about their 4 o'clock position, then he noticed that the accident airplane was
losing altitude. The airplane continued to lose altitude and he observed that the airplane was just above trees, then below them. He observed a cloud of dust and after flying over the area, they spotted the wreckage.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the accident pilot did not hold an airframe and/or powerplant mechanic certificate. The FAA records also indicate that his airman certificate was suspended for 180 days, effective February 9, 1996. The suspension was due to the fact that the pilot operated a multiengine airplane without holding a multiengine class rating, and for operating an unairworthy airplane on a ferry flight from Laredo, Texas, to Jackson, Mississippi, on or about September 27, 1995. According to FAA personnel, after landing in Jackson, Mississippi, the location of a FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO); a FAA Airworthiness Inspector examined the airplane and noted incorrectly installed propellers, no propeller spinners were installed, the nose gear damper mount flange was cracked half way through, the left steering cable was chafing on loose pulley and bracket, the registration number tape was peeling off, metal pipes, automobile hose clamps and rubber straps were utilized to brace the nose landing gear, a large nick was noted in the right propeller tip, a floor
panel was missing behind the pilot's seat, and records were unavailable to prove compliance with Airworthiness Directives.

Review of the pilot's pilot logbook revealed the first entry indicated that his original logbook was lost and all times were approximate. The total flight time carried forward was listed as 150 hours, all of that flight time was in single engine land type airplanes. The first page of the logbook does not indicate any multiengine time carried forward; and the first 4 pages of the logbook do not indicate the year of entry. The fifth page of the logbook which is also the last page with flight time entries, indicates the year to be 1997, with the last entry dated November 19. That entry indicated that he satisfactory passed his multiengine flight test. No determination could be made as to his total flight time since the last logged flight on November 19, 1997. His total logged multiengine flight time was documented to be approximately 41 hours. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

Review of the aircraft maintenance records revealed that on October 16, 1998, the airplane was inspected in accordance with an annual inspection. On October 17, 1998, while being operated by the aircraft owner, the nose and left main landing gears collapsed on landing at the Panama City-Bay County International
Airport, Panama City, Florida. As a result, both propellers were damaged, along with damage to the leading edge of the right wing between the fuselage and the inboard section of the engine nacelle. An inspection of the airplane was performed for the insurance adjuster only for a repair estimate following the incident by personnel from a fixed base operator (FBO) located on the airport. The inspection determined that both propellers were damaged as well as the right wing. No repairs or further inspections were performed to the airplane by personnel of the FBO that inspected the airplane. The airplane remained outside on the ramp from the date of recovery to the day of the accident with the exception of an approximate 1 week period that the airplane was inside a hangar for the inspection. A company by the name of U.S. Air Salvage located in Johnson City, Tennessee, purchased the airplane from the insurance company on April 9, 1999.

According to Mark W. Trent, he is a friend of the accident pilot and is not a FAA certificated airframe or powerplant mechanic. On the day of the accident, he was a passenger in another airplane occupied by the accident pilot and the accident pilot's father. They flew to the Panama City Airport and as later determined by Air Traffic Control, landed at 1311 hours. The replacement propellers were in the airplane with them. After arriving, he observed the accident airplane parked on the ramp; the accident pilot's father removed the left propeller which had been previously damaged, and installed a replacement propeller on the left engine, with the help of the accident pilot. Mr. Trent removed the right propeller which also had been previously damaged and installed a replacement propeller on the right
engine, also with the help of the accident pilot. The replacement propellers were provided by U.S. Air Salvage. Following the removal and replacement of the propellers on the ramp, Mr. Trent added 3 quarts of oil to the left engine which brought the oil level to the full mark, and the accident pilot added 3 quarts of oil to the right engine. He was not sure if the accident pilot's father further inspected the airplane following the removal and installation of the propeller but did report that the accident pilot inspected the airplane. Additionally, a commercial battery purchased at Wal-mart was installed in the accident airplane before the flight departed.
A Special Flight Permit was issued by an FAA Airworthiness Inspector on April 14, 1999, and sent via facsimile to the accident pilot's attention. The permit which was documented to expire 10 days from the date of issue or upon arrival at destination, whichever occurs first, allowed the accident airplane to be flown from Panama City-Bay County International Airport to Tri-Cities Regional TN/VA Airport. The operating limitations listed in the Special Flight Permit included a statement which indicated "An inspection to determine if the aircraft is safe for the intended flight and an entry in the permanent aircraft records of the results of this inspection must be made by an appropriately certified mechanic or repair station before any flight in connection with this authorization is valid." Review of the permanent maintenance records revealed no such entry. On the day of the accident, the permanent maintenance records were in the custody and control of the insurance adjuster from the October 17, 1998, incident.

The accident pilot's father made a verbal statement to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator, on May 3, 1999, that he inspected the airplane for the flight and made an entry in a booklet that was with the ferry permit paperwork in the wreckage that he inspected the airplane and it was safe for the intended ferry flight. He was advised that the booklet was not located in the wreckage and was asked to duplicate the entry that was made and to send it to the NTSB. He stated that he would provide a duplicate of the entry. On May 10, 1999, he was asked to send a duplicate of the entry that he initially reported he made in the booklet. He offered a nebulous statement that he would be fined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) $250,000.00 whether he did or whether he did not provide to the NTSB a copy of the duplicate entry. He was asked for the entry; he refused to comply, and referred further inquiries regarding the duplicate entry to his attorney. On June 7, 1999, a statement dated June 5, 1999, reportedly signed by the accident pilot's father, Jerry Pressley, A & P certificate number 237587185, was sent via facsimile to the NTSB office located in Miami, Florida. The statement indicated "During our last conversation on the telephone you stated that you needed a written statement from me concerning the ferry permit for N6600. I did not sign any document for the aircraft stating that I had inspected the aircraft and found it airworthy for the ferry flight, nor did I sign any statement that could be interpreted to mean anything similar." No contact was made by the NTSB investigator with the attorney between May 10, 1999, and June 7, 1999. Numerous attempts to obtain a written statement from Jerry Pressley regarding his installation of the left propeller through his attorney, were unsuccessful.

According to personnel from U.S. Air Salvage, no maintenance records were located for the propeller that was installed on the left engine of the airplane.

The airplane recording hour/tenth meter recorded a .5 hour increase from the reading following the incident on October 17, 1998, to the reading after the accident on April 23, 1999.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. Additional information pertaining to weather is contained on page 4 of the Factual Report-Aviation.

COMMUNICATIONS

The accident airplane was not equipped with either fixed or portable Very High Frequency (VHF) transceiver which would allow for communications with any Air Traffic Control (ATC) Facility. The ATC communications for the accident airplane was handled through the accident pilot's father flying in another airplane that was to accompany the accident airplane. A transcript of communications with the accident pilot's father who was flying in another airplane is an attachment to this report.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Examination of the ramp where the airplane had been parked before the flight revealed oil on the ground when the location was examined 3 days after the accident.

The airplane crashed at N30 degrees 31.53 minutes and W 085 degrees 22.63 minutes. Examination of the area revealed damage to the top of a 30-foot tall tree.  Ground scars from all landing gears were noted beginning on dry brush 240 feet past the first impact point with the tree. An approximate 20-foot tall un-marked power line located about 50 feet before the ground scars from the landing gears was noted to be undamaged. The descent angle of the airplane from the tree contact to the ground contact was calculated to be 7 degrees. The ground roll which was measured to be about 300 feet, was on a magnetic heading of 040 degrees; ground scars from all landing gears were noted for the full length of the ground roll. The ground scars made by all landing gears continue to a point just before a ditch beyond which a small tree was noted to be broken about 3 feet above ground level. Beyond that point no ground scars from the landing gear were observed. A large diameter tree was determined to be damaged about 5 feet agl , which was 65 feet beyond the damage to the small tree.

The main wreckage which consisted of the fuselage, and empennage, came to rest on a heading of 050 degrees. Both wings were separated from the fuselage. The left wing was resting with the leading edge towards the ground with the engine/propeller assembly attached. The right wing separated into 2 segments; the inboard section of the wing from the wing root to just outboard of the engine nacelle, was beneath the separated nose and cockpit section of the wreckage. The outboard section of the right wing was beneath the aft fuselage section and about 18 inches inboard from the tip was wrapped around a small diameter tree. The right side of the fuselage about 3 feet forward of the leading edge of the right horizontal stabilizer was noted to be wrapped around a tree and the right flap was also wrapped around that same tree. Both horizontal stabilizers and both elevators were in place as well as the vertical stabilizer and rudder assembly. All components necessary to sustain flight were in the immediate vicinity of the crash site. The nose landing gear was braced down, and the brace for the left main landing gear was not in place but the clamps for the brace were in place. The brace for the right main landing gear punctured a hole in the upper surface skin of the right wing. The instrument panel was separated from the airplane. The external portion of the nose cone was noted to be wrapped with an unknown brand of "duct" tape. The right engine propeller was noted to be in the "feathered" position and the flaps were determined to be retracted. Approximately 4 gallons of 100 LL fuel were drained from the right main fuel tank; no contaminants were noted. The remainder of the tanks did not contain fuel. The left and right fuel selectors were found positioned to the left and right main fuel tanks respectively and were in the detents. Examination of the airspeed indicator revealed that a screw head on the dial face exhibited contact by the bottom side of the needle. When positioned with the needle above the screw head, the needle was pointing to the 85 mph position. The lower limit of the green arc is 81 mph. Examination of the fuel supply system revealed no obstructions from either main fuel tank to each selector valve. No fuel was found in the fuel line at the fuel selector from each main fuel tank. Both auxiliary fuel pumps operationally checked satisfactory. The rudder trim was found positioned 6 degrees nose left as measured at the actuator.

Examination of the fuel tanks vent system for the left wing revealed that the main fuel tank vent line was unobstructed from the inlet to the static hole which is located on the aft side of the line 1.25 inches from the inlet. The line was obstructed downstream of the static hole. There was no damage to the main fuel tank vent line that extended beneath the wing. The inlet portion of the vent line for the left auxiliary fuel tank was not located; no obstructions were noted in the remaining
section of the line to the fuel tank. An insect resembling a wasp was observed in the left main fuel tank vent system downstream of the inlet. Each opening at the anti icing fuel vent were blocked; blockage was also noted downstream of the inlet of the anti icing fuel vent for the auxiliary fuel tank. The blockage at that location was tan in color. The flush fuel vent located outboard of the auxiliary fuel tank was noted to be blocked approximately 2.5 inches downstream of the inlet; the inlet was not obstructed.

Examination of the fuel tanks vent system for the right wing revealed that the main fuel tank vent line was blocked within the first 1.25 inches of the line. The portion that was extended beneath the bottom skin of the wing exhibited no evidence of damage. The right wing auxiliary fuel tank vent line was found to be blocked within the first 1.5 inches of the line. Again, the portion that extended beneath the bottom portion of the wing exhibited no evidence of damage. Each opening at the anti icing fuel vent were blocked; blockage was also noted downstream of the inlet of the anti icing fuel vent for the right auxiliary fuel tank. The flush fuel vent located outboard of the auxiliary fuel tank was noted to be blocked approximately 1 inch downstream of the inlet; the inlet also was not obstructed.

Examination of the left engine revealed that the top spark plug for the No.1 cylinder was not in place; the threads in the cylinder were not damaged. Oil residue was noted clinging to the interior portion of the engine cowling above that location. Also, all the remaining top ignition leads were loose. Crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity was confirmed and thumb compression was noted from each cylinder. Impact damage to the left magneto precluded determination of magneto to engine timing. The right magneto was determined to be properly timed to the engine. The top spark plug in the No. 3 cylinder was noted to be only finger tight. No evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction was noted from the engine or accessories. The fuel line from the engine driven fuel pump to the servo fuel injector was removed at the servo fuel injector and only residual fuel was found. The fuel line from the servo fuel injector (servo) to the manifold valve was disconnected at the servo fuel injector and no fuel was found. The left propeller was retained for further examination.

Examination of the left propeller revealed markings in the propeller hub which indicates that it was manufactured by Hartzell Propeller, Inc., and the model number was recorded to be HC-A2VK-2, serial number H1326. The No. 1 propeller blade was noted to be model 8433-10. Both propeller blades were bent towards
the blade face with a gouge noted on the leading edge of the No. 1 propeller blade about 1.5 inches from the blade tip. Chordwise scratches were noted on the blade back of the No. 1 propeller blade about 1 inch and 2.5 inches from the blade tip. Chordwise gouges were noted in the No. 2 propeller blade back about 7.5 inches and 10 inches from the blade tip. One gouge on the blade face of the No. 2 propeller blade was noted 3.5 inches from the blade tip and 1 inch from the trailing edge of the blade. The centrifugal latches and the latch plates for the two propeller blades were not broken but the piston was broken adjacent to the No. 1 propeller blade. Additionally, the outer spring was noted to be broken with evidence of a preexisting crack. There was no evidence of repositioning of the propeller blades to adjust the low pitch propeller blade angle.

Examination of the right engine revealed crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity. Thumb compression was noted from each cylinder. All ignition leads and plugs were tightly installed and both magnetos were determined to be properly timed to the engine. The fuel inlet screen at the servo was noted to be clean. No evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction was noted from the engine or accessories. The fuel line from the engine driven fuel pump to the servo was removed at the servo and residual fuel was noted. The fuel line from the servo to the manifold valve was removed at the servo and no fuel was found. Only residual fuel was found at the servo, the engine driven fuel pump, and at the auxiliary fuel pump. The right engine propeller was retained for further examination.

Examination of the right propeller revealed markings in the propeller hub which indicates that it was manufactured by Hartzell Propeller, Inc., and the model number was recorded to be HC92ZK-2B, serial number 176F. The propeller blades were determined to be model 8447-12A. Both propeller latch plates were
intact and the No. 2 propeller blade was noted to be bent aft approximately 1/4 inch as measured at the blade tip. The propeller was cycled from low pitch to the feather position with no discrepancies noted.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

A postmortem examination of the pilot was performed by Marie A. Herrmann, M.D., Chief Medical Examiner, District Fourteen, Panama City, Florida. The cause of death was listed as complete aortic laceration due to blunt force trauma. Toxicological testing was performed by the FAA Accident and Research Laboratory (CAMI) and the University of Florida Diagnostic Referral Laboratories (U. of F.). The results of analysis by CAMI was negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, volatiles, and tested drugs. The results of analysis by the U. of F. Laboratory was negative in the blood and urine for ethanol and for the comprehensive drug screen. ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION

Review of FAA records revealed that the accident pilot's father who was the holder of an airframe and powerplant mechanic certificate, had his mechanic certificate revoked by the Federal Aviation Administrator effective July 15, 1987, for a period of one year. The order of revocation also indicated that "No
application for a new mechanic certificate shall be made by or accepted from you, nor shall any mechanic certificate be issued to you for a period of one (1) year from the date you surrender your certificate to the Federal Aviation Administration as ordered herein...." Review of the true copy of Mr. Pressley's airman file revealed that in 1993, he wrote a letter to the FAA in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and requested a duplicate of his airframe and powerplant certificate. The request was complied with in error by the FAA. According to FAA personnel, after revocation of a certificate, the person must take any required written tests, oral, and practical tests before any certificate can be issued. There was no record that he had prepared an application for a airframe or powerplant mechanic certificate after July 15, 1988.

Review of the airplane type certificate data sheet revealed that the propeller model installed on the left engine at the time of the accident (HC-A2VK-2) was not listed as an approved propeller. According to Hartzell Propeller Application Guide, the propeller model installed on the left engine at the time of the accident is designed for either a Piper PA-23-235 or a Piper PA-23-250. According to the type certificate data sheets for those airplanes, each engine is rated at 235 or 250 horsepower at 2,575 rpm, respectively. The accident airplane type certificate data sheet indicates that each engine is rated at 180 horsepower at 2,700 rpm.

According to personnel from Hartzell Propeller, Inc., the differences of the propeller blades from the installed propeller vs. for the propeller approved for the accident airplane are blade width and thickness, edge and face alignment, and pitch distribution. A graph was prepared that listed the power required by the engine to rotate the propeller/propeller blades installed on the left engine position. The graph is predicated that the engine is producing 95 percent of 180 horsepower, the
propeller blades were fixed at 15.5 degrees, and a standard sea level day. The graph indicates that at 25 knots (29 mph), the propeller could only rotate at 2,375 rpm. The graph also indicates that the propeller would only be capable of operating at 2,700 rpm (the designed rpm limit for the accident airplane per the type certificate data sheet), when the airplane accelerated to approximately 79 knots (91 mph). According to the line service employee of an FBO located on the airport, he filled all four fuel tanks before the flight departed. He also stated that since the time he has been employed by the FBO, the accident airplane has been on the ramp. He also stated that while fueling the airplane, he could observe lines and tubing in the area between the fuselage and inboard side of the engine nacelle
on the right side of the airplane. He did not hear the engines being started but the airplane taxied past his position towards the runway. He did not witness maintenance being performed to the airplane the day of the accident.

The wreckage was released to Billy F. Smith of the Calhoun County Sheriff Department on April 25, 1999. The pilot's pilot logbook, aircraft logbooks #1 and 2, left engine logbook (2 logs), right engine logbook (2 logs), and a yellow envelope that contained documents, was retained by the NTSB on June 21, 1999. The retained logbooks and documents were released to Mrs. Jacky Pressley, of U.S. Air Salvage, on June 23, 1999. The retained left propeller model HC-A2VK-2 serial number H1326, with propeller spinner and right propeller model HC92ZK-2B serial number 176F, were released to Ms. C. Anderson, Secretary for U.S. Air Salvage, on October 25, 1999.

NTSB Identification: MIA94LA188

Accident occurred JUL-29-94 at YAZOO CITY, MS
Aircraft: PIPER J5C, registration: N74669
Injuries: 1 Minor, 2 Uninjured.

ABOUT 10 MINUTES INTO A LOCAL FLIGHT, THE ENGINE LOST POWER AND THE PILOT MADE A FORCED LANDING TO AN OPEN FIELD. THE AIRPLANE NOSED OVER ON LANDING. AN EXAMINATION OF THE CARBURETOR REVEALED A WASP NEST IN THE VENTURI THAT SWELLED WHEN SATURATED WITH FUEL. THE NEST WAS INSIDE THE CARBURETOR AND WAS NOT VISIBLE ON
PREFLIGHT.
Probable Cause
PARTIAL BLOCKAGE OF THE CARBURETOR BY A WASP NEST, WHICH WAS NOT VISIBLE DURING PREFLIGHT, AND WHICH RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF POWER.

NTSB Identification: LAX96FA317. The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.

Accident occurred AUG-24-96 at PHOENIX, AZ
Aircraft: Cessna 441, registration: N832AD
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

At flight level 240, the pilot noticed that the wing deice boots were fully inflated, though he had not activated the boots. He consulted the pilot operator handbook, but was unable to cycle the boots. During descent about 5,000 feet msl, there was a loud bang along with a jolt. The pilot noticed that the right wing had imploded or caved in. He also noted that aileron control had been affected. He declared an emergency, was vectored to the nearest airport, and landed without further incident. Postaccident examination of the aircraft revealed: the engine bleed air control valve overboard lines were both plugged with mud about 18 inches up inside from the overboard opening; and both NACA underwing fuel vents were found plugged with mud about 36 inches from the underwing opening. The mud was from wasp nests. There were secondary fuel vents in the fuel filler caps. The right fuel cap vent was 50 percent restricted from a recent wing repaint. Both fuel cap flutter valves were defective. The aircraft had been parked outside for 30 days.
Probable Cause
blockage of the fuel vent system due to mud from wasp nest(s). Inadequate maintenance was a related factor.